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226 BLUMBERG v. M. & T. INCORPORATED [34 C.2d 
[So F. No. 17945. In Bank. Aug. 31. 1949.] . 
BENJAMIN BLUMBERG et a1., Appellants, V. M. & T. 
INCORPORATED (a Corporation) et a1., Respondents. 
[1] Dismissal-Upon Failure of Proof-When Motion Granted.-
A nonsuit may be granted only when, (iisregarding conflicting 
evidence and giving plaintiff's evidenc~ all the value to which 
it is legally entitled, indulging in every '.!gitimate inference 
which may be drawn from that evidence, the result is a de-
termination that there is no evidence of sufficient substantial-
ity to support a verdict for plaintiff. 
[2] Negligence-Invit~ee-Duties Toward.-Persons invited by an 
o!:ice building tenant to see his office are business visitors, 
and as to them the property owner is obliged to exercise ordi-
nary care to keep the premises in a reasonably 'lafe condition, 
or to warn them of danger. The duty is not limited to con-
ditions actually known by the owner to be dangerous, but 
extends also to conditions which might have been found 
dangerous by the exercise of reasonable care. 
[3) Id.-Nonsuit.-In an action against the o,vner of an office 
building for personal injuries sustained by a tenant's in-
vitee in the lobby of the building when she fell on a floor 
mat, it was improper to grant a nonsuit where the evidence 
showed that the mat had o,;>enings of sufficient size to allow 
a heel of a shoe, such 'as that worn by plaintiff and a large 
number of women, to slip into one of such openings, and the 
j .. ry reasonably could have in~erred from the evidence that 
her heel became wedged in the mat in precispiy that manner, 
and where it was also a question of fact for the jury whether 
the nature of the mat was obvious to plaintiff. 
[4] Id.-Oare by Owners of Real Propert;i-Buildings.-The fa.lt 
that a floor mat in the lobby of an office building is wide,Iy 
used is no legal excuse for the owner's maintenance of a 
dangerous condition in the mat. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of thp 
City and County of San Francisco. Pat R.Parker, Judge.· 
Reversed. 
(2) Se\! 19 Oal.Jur. 618; 38 Am.Jur. 754. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, § ~5; [2j Negligence, 
§73; [31 Negligence. §l77: [41 Np'!ligPD('e. §60. 
• Assigned by Chainnao df J uuicial Council. 
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Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment of non-
suit. reversed. 
Ernest I. Spiegl for Appellants. 
Cooley, Crowley, Gaither & Dana. Cooley, Crowley" Gaither 
and Louis V. Crowley for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J .-Benjamin and Charlotte Blumberg sued 
to recover damages for personal injuries which she assertedly 
SUBtained when she . fell in the lobby of a downtown office 
building in San Francisco. Their appeal from an adverse 
judgment challenges the ruling of the trial court granting 
the property owner's motion for a nonsuit. 
According to the settled stIltement, about two bours 
after a dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Isaacs, the Blum-
bergs accompanied .their friends to see Mr. Isaacs' office. The 
accident occurred after they returned to the ground ft.oor. 
Mrs. Blumberg testified in part: ". . .1 remember taking 
a few steps and then all of a sudden . • . there was a feel-
ing as though . something beld me down and right with that 
simultaneously my bead was hitting this terruzo ft.oor and 
someone called out. It was all in one, this blow bere; I just 
remember going down and cracking my bead." When asked 
whether there was "any sensation as if your foot bad slipped'" 
she replied: HOb, no." She gave the same answer to the 
question: "Was there any sensation of your ankle having 
turned'" In further explanation of ber injuries, she said 
that she fell on a large mat in front of the elevat.ors while 
walking with bead erect, watcbing ber way. AB described by 
her, she fell toward the lobby door,with ht'r bead striking 
the bare ft.oor and ber legs on the mat. After the accident, 
bel' right stocking bore the imprint of the mat. 
Mrs. Isaacs testified that, after the two couples' descended 
in the elevator, the men preCt'ded their wives across the lobby. 
'Mrs. Blumberg followed them. Mrs. Isaacs. walking slightly 
. behind the three, saw Mrs. Blumberg fall .... absollltply 
straight as though she bad bad som('thing hold hE'r 01' pull 
her ... She fell in one straight l':-.np ... bel' knpE'S didn't 
go down ft.rst, her arms didn't go down first. . . ." M1'R. IRaacs 
added that, immediately prior to thE' aI'I'M"nt. M l'R. Rlum-
berg's mannel' of walking WaR nOl'mal. She was not running, 
and the witness did not see ber slip • 
/ 
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The record shows that the mat mentioned in the nidenee. 
was constructed of small pieces or strips of rubber or similar; 
material held together in a row, running in both directionS' 
at right angles, with open spaces of varying sizes up to, but 
not greater than, 1-1/16th of an inch by 5/8ths of an inch. A 
witness familiar with the shoe business testified that the left 
shoe worn by Mrs. Blumberg on the night of the accident 
was made with a medium spike heel of the type worn on the 
.treet by about 60 per cent of the women in San Francisco. 
The usual measurement across the base of heels of this type, 
he added, is from 11 to 12/16ths of an inch. However, Mrs.. 
Blumberg's heel had been shortened on a trimmer and 
measured 14:/16ths of an inch across the front of the base and 
13/16ths of an inch from front to rear. Upon cross enmina-
tion, he declared that a small cap at the base of the heel had 
been put on by a repair shop; that the shoe was a regular 
street shoe rather than an evening shoe; and that there is no 
such thing as a standard heel . 
.As justifying a reversal of the judgment on the ground 
that this evidence would support a verdict and judgment in 
their favor, the Blumbergs contend that the evidence is suf-
ficient to warrant a finding that Mrs. Blumberg'. left heel 
became Wedged in one of the interstices in the mal Their 
theory is that, although ber heel was too large to enter any 
one of the spaces squarely, it must have entered and become 
wedged in one of the 1-1/16th of an inch by 5/Sths of an inch 
spaces when brought down at an angle with toe raised, in the ' 
manner common to women walking in high-heeled shoes. The 
evidence also indicates, they argue, that the accident could 
not have happened in any other manner, since she did not 
slip, trip or turn her ankle, and there was no foreign matter 
on the mat. As the basis of liability, it is said that the size 
of the openings was inherently dangerous for the San Fran- : 
cisco women who wear such heels for street use, and the prop-
erty owner knew, or should have known, of such danger. 
Finally, it is said, the Blumbergs were invitees, and the prop-
erty owner owed a duty to maintain the lobby in a life con-
dition or to give warning of any danger . 
.As justifying the ruling on the motion, the respondent 
takes the position that the evidence offered by the Blumbergs 
is insufficient to support a verdict for them because (1) it 
does not show that the mat was defective; nor (2) that it 
was dangerously constructed, or different from mats gener-
ally used in office building lobbies; nor (3) that the property 
.I 
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owner knew the relation between the sizes of the heel of a 
woman's shoe and the openings in the mat; nor (4) that the 
owner knew, or had any reason to believe, that there was 
danger in maintaining the mat; nor (5) that Mrs. Blum-
berg's heel actually caught in an opening in the mat. Finally, 
they insist, if the mat was dangerous, its nature was obvious 
to Mrs. Blumberg, who was therefore warned of its condition. 
[1] A trial court is justified in granting a motion for non-
suit ". . . when, and only when, disregarding con1licting 
evidence, and giving to plainti1f's evidence all the value to 
which it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate 
inference which may be drawn from that evidenc.>.e, the re-
sult is a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient 
substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff." 
(Card v. BomB, 210 Cal. 200, 202 [291 P. 190]; see, also, 
Hale v. Depaoli, 88 Ca1.2d 228, 229 [201 P.2d 1]; Neel v. 
Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647, 650 [122 P.2d 576] ; Estate 01 
Lances, 216 Cal. 897,401 [14 P.2d 768].) As stated in Estate 
of Lances, supra, page 400, "Unless it can be said as a matter 
of law, that ... no other reasonable conclusion is legally 
deducible from the evidence, and that any other holding would 
be 80 lacking in evidentiary support that a reviewing court 
would be impelled to reverse it upon appeal, or the trial 
court to set it aside as a matter of law, the trial court is not 
justified in taking the case from the jury." 
[2] As invitees of Mr. and Mrs. Isaacs, tenants of the 
building, the Blumbergs were business visitors and as to them 
the property owner was obliged to exercise ordinary care to 
keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, or to warn 
them of danger. The duty was not limited to conditions actu-
ally known by the owner to be dangerous, but extended also 
to conditions which might have been found dangerous by the 
exercise of reasonable care. (Mondine v. Sarlin, 11 Cal.2d 
593, 597 [81 P.2d 903] ; Dobbie v. Pacific Gas ct Electric Co., 
95 Cal.App. 781, 790 [278 P. 630].) 
[8] The uncontradicted testimony clearly shows that the 
floor mat upon which Mrs. Blumberg fell had openings of 
sufficient size to allow a portion of the heel of her shoe to 
slip into one of them, at least at an angle. There is also evi-
dence that the shoes of a large number of the women in San 
Francisco have heels of the size worn by her. Accordingly, 
the jury reasonably could have inferred that her left heel 
became wedged in the mat in precisely that manner, causing 
her to fall. 
') 
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Reasonable inquiry and inspection would have informe 
. the property owner that it was maintaining in the lobb' 
a mat with openings likely to retain and hold the heel 
of a shoe such as is customarily worn by a large number 0 
the women in San Francisco. Moreover, whether the nature 
of the mat was obvious to Mrs. Blumberg was a question 
of fact for the determination of the jury. [41 The claim that 
the mat in question was widely used is no legal excuse for 
the maintenance of a dangerous condition. The fact that 
a negligent practice is general does not transform it into 
reasonable care. . 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Spence, J.t concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
A possessor of land is not an insurer of the. safety of his 
business guests, nor is he liable for harm resulting from a 
condition from which no unreasonable risk was to be antiei-
pated. He "is subject to liability for bodily harm caused 
to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon 
if, but only if, he 
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could 
discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should 
realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them (HifUls v. 
Wheadon, 19 Cal.2d 458, 460 [121 P.2d 724]; Beese v. Smith, 
9 Ca1.2d 324,328 [70 P.2d 933]; CkapmaflV. Title lmurance 
ct Trust Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 745, 751 [158 P.2d 42] ; Jrmes v. 
Bridges, 38 Cal.App.2d 341, 345 [101 P.2d 91]), and 
(b) has DO reason to believe that they will discover the 
condition or realize the risk involved therein (Blodgett v. 
B. H. DyaB Co., 4 Cal.2d 511, 512-513 [50 P.2d 801] ; Shanley 
v. American OUfl6 Co., 185 Cal. 552, 555 [197 P. 793]; Boyal 
lmurance Co. v. Mazzei, 50 Cal.App.2d 549, 552-553 [123 P.2d 
586]), and 
(c) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the 
land without exercising reasonable care 
(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or 
(ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid 
the harm." (2 Restatement, Torts, § 343, pp. 938-939.) It 
was therefore incumbent on plaintiffs to present evidence from 
which reasonable men could conclude; (1) that defend-
anb should have realized that the mat involved an unrea-
IOnabIe risk to business visitors; and (2) that defendants 
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had no reason to believe such visitors would realize the risk 
involved therein. In my opinion there was no evidence that 
would warrant either of these conclusions. 
1. The evidence fails to show that the mat was in any 
way different from those in general use. (Yearsley v. Ameri-
can Stores 00.,97 Pa.Super. 275,277.) There was no evidence 
that other persons had slipped or fallen on that mat or similar 
mats, which might have given defendants reason to believe 
that the continued use of the mat would be dangerous. The 
majority opinion states that "The fact that a negligent 
practice is general does not transform it into reasonable care." 
It is equally true, however, that a practice that has been 
generally followed without incident is not transformed into 
negligence merely by the occurrence of a single accident not 
reasonably foreseeable. Plaintiffs rely upon the testimony of 
a witness familiar with the shoe business that plaintiff was 
wearing the type of heel that 60 per cent of the women of 
San Francisco wear for street use. Even if it is assumed 
that defendants were aware of this fact, it does not follow 
that they should have concluded therefrom that the mat 
was unsafe. There is no negligence if harm could not rea-
sonably be foreseen. 'c The standard must be one of conduct, 
not of consequences." (Prosser, Torts, § 35, p. 220.) Any 
accident raises the question whether it couId reasonably be 
foreseen, but one cannot conclude that it eould have been 
foreseen merely because it occurred; negligence cannot be 
inferred by looking backward "with the wisdom born of the 
event." (Cardozo, C. J., in Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay tt cU" 
Co., 257 N.Y. 190, 192 [177 N.E. 416] ; Dickson v. Emporium 
Mercant'ile Co., Inc., 193 Minn. 629, 631 {259 N.W. 375].} 
It is plaintiffs' theory that the heel of Mrs. Blumberg's 
.boe became wedged in one of the interstices of defendants' 
mat after being inserted at an angle with the toe pointed 
upward. They contend that "the accident could not have 
happened in any other manner." Diagram B illustrates the 
outline of Mrs. Blumberg's shoe with the heel in what plain-
tiffs term "the situation which must have occurred at the 
moment of Mrs. Blumberg's injury." They contend that as 
her toe descended and her foot rolled forward, the back of 
her heel, describing an are, wedged against the latitudinal 
strip of the interstice, causing bE'r to fall. Even if it is 
assumed that the accident occurred according to plaintiffs' 
theory, can it reasonably be said that it was within the normal 
) 
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scope of prevision of a possessor of land' A coDllpa,risc)n'1 
the sizes of the base of Mrs. Blumberg's heel and the 1&1"PtlII 
space in the mat demonstrates the unlikelihood of a 
I" 
-116---
DIAGRAM A 
14" 
------16 
wedging in the manner alleged. Had plaintiif stepped .",nugB, 
down on the mat, it would admittedly have been im:pos$ib,,,, 
for her heel to enter the interstice. The accident could 
have occurred, by plaintiifs' own admission, because 
Blumberg crossed the mat at a right angle to the long 
of the interstice and the heel fell well into it. It is 
from Diagram B that plaintiif's toe must have been rai:setla 
at a relatively high angle and at about the only angle 
could prevent the heel from swinging free as plaintiff stelPpe:4~a 
forward. The jury might have inferred that these unllSUlll.l 
circumstances conspired to cause Mrs. Blumberg to fall. 
the duty to anticipate such a possibility, which became alJIPIU:~ 
ent only by hindsight, cannot be said to be part of the 
quirement of ordinary care. (Bar41l v. Beoo.i1lg Iron Co., 
Pa. 274 [51 A. 979]; Austin v. Eastern Mass. St. By. 
269 Mass. 420 [169 N.E. 484] ; see, also, Whiting v. City 
National City, 9 Cal.2d 163, 165, 166 [69 P.2d 990] ; Dac:u£6,WSJl'" 
v. Shea, 114 Cal. 1, 7 [45 P. 990, 55 Am.St.Rep. 56, 33 
747].) 
2. Even if· reasonable men could diifer as to whether 
mat created an unreasonable risk to business visitors, 
judgment should be affirmed Any danger inherent in the 
mat was as apparent to Mrs. Blumberg as to defendants, and' 
a reasonable jury could not conclude that defendants had 
reason to believe that she would not realize the risk involved .. 
in walking across the mat with the type of heels she was wear-
ing. One ordinarily looks where one is going, and the inter-
stices of the mat were clearly visible. There was nothing 
unusual about them in size or design, nothing defective, to 
trip the average walker. Actually there was no danger in 
the mat lying in wait for Mrs. Blumberg. The danger to be 
) 
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anticipated was from the spiked heels, not from the· mat. 
Those who walk on spiked heels court danger. That is their 
privilege, but it is also their responsibility to consider the 
consequences, to be aware of the peculiarities of the shoes 
they wear. Mrs. Blumberg not only could see everything that 
defendants could by looking at the mat, over which sbe had 
walked when she entered the building, but she knew as they 
did not the type of heel she was wearing. An" owner is en-
titled to assume that such invitee will perceive that which 
would be obvious to him upon the ordinary use of his own 
senses." (Shanley v. American Olive Co., 185 Cal. 552. 555 
[197 P. 193] ; Royal Insurance Co. v. Mazzei, 50 CaI.App.2d 
549, 552-553 [123 P.2d 586]; see, also, Blodgett v. B. H. 
Dyo,s Co., 4: Ca1.2d 511, 512·513 [50 P.2d 801].) 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
